Army Will Soon Implement A New, Costly Force Protection Plan
by Erin Q. Winograd

The Army will soon implement a new force protection plan to correct a host of deficiencies that make domestic installations vulnerable to terrorist attacks once considered unlikely but now thought probable in today's security environment, sources indicate.

The enhanced force protection measures come at a price, however, that will immediately reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

The majority of Army bases and camps in the United States are ill-prepared to prevent, detect or respond to a terrorist incident. According to service documents, a lack of force structure at the individual and unit levels, insufficient equipment and inadequate intelligence fusion capabilities limit the ability of domestic installations to execute force protection plans. From a broader, doctrinal perspective, the material that directs force protection activities is severely outdated: Guidelines are derived from manuals published in 1999, 1998 and 1997, a period which many would argue has little relevance to the contemporary operational environment.

The Sept. 11 attacks against the Pentagon and New York's World Trade Center -- the first internationally sponsored terrorist act to occur on American soil in modern times -- brought the problem of installation preparedness into sharp focus. Documents show that shortly after the attacks, the Army began crafting a formal, force protection operational and organizational plan to address the needs of domestic bases. The new O&O represents "a shift in paradigm" and utilizes a capabilities and threat-based approach for developing a force protection solution, a draft version states.

The plan calls for proactive, independent assessment and response by installation chiefs. A higher command will not define the installation "battlespace" or issue "battle" orders. In a late draft of the O&O, a general framework is established to define the installation commander's areas of operation and responsibility. The document also establishes new force structure and capability requirements.

The centerpiece of installation force protection is the Installation Operations Center. Currently, some bases maintain a permanent IOC, but most do not. The O&O mandates that every installation will now have a fixed-site IOC, manned and operated 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. A backup location and a mobile version of the center are also desirable, it notes.

The IOC is the base's command and control node and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance center for force protection. It will monitor security status, coordinate force protection assets to deter and mitigate threats, and respond to internal and external crises. It will be self-contained and able to support operations even in the event of chemical, biological or radiological attacks.

The O&O calls for the IOC to be equipped with government-off-the-shelf and commercial-off-the-shelf technology. The choice of materiel must enable the center to communicate with outside agencies such as local, state and federal law enforcement, the National Command Authority, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and other non-military entities. Today, that cross-communication is difficult and sometimes impossible, the O&O notes.

The IOC shall be entirely below ground to minimize signature and contain redundant systems particularly for power generation and communications.

IOC staffing levels will vary according to installation size and the threat condition, but the O&O delineates minimum personnel for certain cells within the IOC. At a major command, the IOC intelligence group will consist of 33 dedicated people, including six counterintelligence analysts from the Intelligence and Security Command. A major installation must have 11 IOC staff tasked to intel. INSCOM will supply two counterintelligence special agents to 97 bases designated as major installations.

The O&O emphasizes that automated intel fusion and analysis hardware and software are crucial to establishing a successful intelligence cell.

To further enhance intelligence capabilities, INSCOM will add five analysts and two more collection managers to the Army Counterintelligence Center. It will also create a pool of contract linguists, states the O&O.

In addition to an intelligence fusion and analysis cell, the IOC will include personnel to direct: operations, plans, medical requirements, training, communications, chem/bio/radiological detection and threat assessment, finance and resource management, logistics, and legal matters (from the Command Judge Advocate's office).

The O&O sets the commander's area of operations, which is delineated by the installation boundary and divided into concentric subsections. An inner ring encompasses mission essential vulnerable areas (MEVAs), high-risk personnel (HRPs) and high-risk targets (HRTs). This area "must be protected," the draft states. A middle ring includes the rest of the installation and items such as housing and ammunition storage facilities. A third, outer band is considered the commander's area of influence; he can have direct impact in this region through public affairs command information channels and through contacts with local government officials, law enforcement agencies and emergency management agencies.

A subsequent "area of interest," though not dealt with in the O&O, is mentioned as a sphere distant from the installation where unfolding events may indicate changes in the threat to the installation.

A commander also must manage and assume protective responsibility of the corridors used for troop movements to and from his installation.

Most installations do not have the ability to handle terrorist attacks. The force protection plan remedies this by establishing several specialized units to be placed at the commander's disposal. To help mitigate the risks associated with the early stages of an incident, each installation will have a "special reaction team." The 10-man SRT will conduct: precision and surgical high-risk entry for barricaded persons (with or without hostages); drug raids; apprehension of dangerous suspects; counter-sniper operations; and precision offensive sniper operations. The team will also help gather information and intelligence.

Documents note that installations currently do not have adequate training and other resources (human and materiel) to employ SRTs effectively. Some even rely on external agencies for SRT-type support.

The Army already employs Quick Reaction Forces but currently waits until threat conditions escalate to the Charlie or Delta level before assembling and training the teams. The O&O states that, given today's operational environment, the QRF must become a standing body prepared to act no matter what the current THREATCON status.

The QRF is defined as an "otherwise uncommitted security force" available to the commander at all times. It will respond to unforeseen threat circumstances that exceed the capability of regular guards and other augmentation forces. Possible missions include: reacting to access control point breaches; reinforcement of MEVA augmentation forces; establishment of an outer perimeter at an incident site; dismounted and mounted patrols; riot control operations; and clearing and securing facilities.

The QRF will have a four-man platoon headquarters, including a medic, and up to four, eight-man squads.

The O&O places a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Installation Support Team at the commander's disposal, as well. The unit is tasked to prevent, deter, detect, defend and respond to a potential use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and toxic industrial chemicals or materials. The team will provide the installation a limited but immediate response capability; after 24 hours, its resources will be exhausted. The CBRN-IST will be able to perform limited decontamination, triage and other emergency procedures to minimize casualties and contaminant spread.

If the scope of the incident exceeds the abilities of the unit, which will have fewer than 20 people, the commander could call in a Regional Response Team (see related story).

The CBRN teams will be costly. The O&O calls for 150 IST units and eight RRT units for domestic bases, and 114 IST groups and three RRTs for installations overseas. Additionally, the Army will stand up 54 chemical companies (compo 1, 2 and 3) stateside and seven OCONUS. The total predicted bill exceeds $290 million: $186 million for domestic installations and $104.8 million for overseas bases.

The O&O, which has gone through at least four iterations, has not yet been finalized.
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The Numbers?
For CONUS, 150 ISTs at 20 pers each, 8 RRTs at 40 pers (actual number is unknown but it must be significantly greater than an IST), and 54 CHEMCOs at 30 pers (19 is the "by definition" minimum number of personnel it takes to form a "company"and 115 is the DOS (Desired Organization Structure) norm, but 30 is a more accurate with the rest being "vacancies" to justify the rank structure) equals 3,000 + 320 + 1,520 = 4,840 personnel.  Assuming that the $186 million is the annual budget, that comes out to cost less than $38,430 per person per year!  That may be about right if you include salary, clothing, food, lodging, health care and life insurance (all the things the Army takes care of); BUT then that leaves NOTHING for phone bills, electricty, transportation, equipment, facilities, bullets and batteries!
                                                                                      Web Site Ed.